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IN MEMORIAM
As this report was going to press early in February 1979, the members
of the committee were saddened by the death of Robert B. Young, a
distinguished colleague and a major contributor to their deliberations
and conclusions.
PREFACE
In December 1977, concerned with delays in the development of the main
engines for the maiden voyage of the space shuttle, the Subcommittee
on Science, Technology, and Space of the U.S. Senate Committee on
Cemmerce, Science, and Transportation asked the Natiora! Research
Council to review the situation. In January 1978, the Research
Council established the ad hoc Committee for the Review of the Space
Shuttle Main Engine Development Program, under the Assembly of
Engineering. By the end of March of that year, the ad hoc Committee
had issued its report, Technical Status of the Space Shuttle Main
Engine, and its chairman, Eugene E. Covert, had testified before the
'	 Senate Subcommittee.
in view of the concerns about several critical components in the
main engine and the uncertainties in maintaining the planned schedule
for the first manned flight of the space shuttle, Senator Adlai E.
Stevenson, the Subcommittee's chairman, requested at the conclusion
of the public hearing on March 31, 1978, that the ad hoc Committee
should perform another examination of the development program in the
fall of 1978. Accordingly, the review committee met October 30-31,
1978, at the National Space Technology Laboratories, Bay St. Louis,
Mississippi, where the main engine is being tested.
The committee's assessment took account of two sets of problems
-- some that were considered in its earlier review and continue to
cause concern and those that have appeared during the engine tests
since March 1978. In its first report the committee had concentrated
on the engine for the first manned flight. In the subsequent review
it gale more emphasis to longer range matters of the main engine
system.
During December 1973, as the second report was nearing comple-
tion, the engine development program encountered two setbacks. On
December 5, 1978, a fire occurred as a result of a leak in the heat
exchanger of a test engine--a component the review committee had
singled out for concern in its first report. On December 27, a fire
originating in the main oxygen valve nearly destroyed another engine.
v
As a direct consequence of these incidents, the Senate
Subcommittee called on the ad hoc Committee to review the latest
problems and reexamine its previous findings and conclusions before
submitting its second report. Thus, the review committee met again
February 1-2, 1979, at the National Academy of Sciences in
Washington, D.C., to hear the accounts of the origins and consequences
of the incidents and to deliberate on their implications for the
development of the shuttle's main engine.
This report contains the findings and recommendations of the
review committee as a result of its meetings in October 1978 and
February 1979.
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INTRODUCTION
The space shuttle, a winged spacecraft designed to carry a num'5er of
people and a large payload into space and to return to earth for
subsequent reuse, is regarded as significant to America's future in
space. During its development, even as late as 1978, the main engine
for the space shuttle encountered a succession of problems -- many
of them, however, typical of those usually experienced in the early
stages of a major technological advance. The solutions to these prob-
lems have required the r:design of some components in the main engine
and the modification of others.
Existing rocket en gines are insufficient for the shuttle, and
even new engines of conventional design cannot attain the performance
level required. The shuttle is to be powered by three main engines,
using a staged-combust *,.on cycle for high efficiency and operating on
hydrogin and oxygen at a chamber pressure of 3,000 pounds per square
inch -- several times mule *"an previous flight engines. Each
engine must deliver up to 1,b68,000 newtons (or 375,000 pounds) of
thrust at sea level, with the highest combination of thrust-to-weight
ratio and specific .impulse ever required in a rocket unit (see
Figure 1).
In its first repo.-t, the committee had observed:
The development of such an operational engin3 requires a
greater step forward in technology over the J-2 rocket,
which was used in the two upper stages of the Saturn
vehicle that launched the Apollo spacecraft to the moon,
than the J-2 did over its predecessor, the RL-10 engine.
However, any risk involved in making such an advance is
reduced by the knowledge and experience gained through
the development of the USAF Rocket Propulsion Laboratory
- Pratt $ Whitney experimental XLR-129 engine rnd the
subsequent NASA Marshall Space Flight Center - rratt &
Whitney turbo-machinery program that produced turbopumps
for an eng-ine of 350,000 pounds of thrust. These two
programs were experimental and, in fact, were not intended
to reach the operational stage. Neverthele-s, they clear-
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3anticipated the successful development of the space
_..uttle main engine .1
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the
builder of the main engine, Rocketdyne Division of Rockwell
International Corporation, decided to use a "success-dependent"
strategy for developing the engine. This strategy is a departure
from the trad;.tional procedure of development stages in that component-
development testing was foreshortened and the quantity of spare parts
was severely limited. The success-dependent procedure was intended to
offer potential savings in c05i, and time, by eliminating parallel and
possibly redundant development and test hardware. However, as the
committee noted in its earlier report, if or when malfunctions occur
during the testing of the prototype of the operational engine, new
hardware may need to be designed, constructed, and retrofitted,
resulting in delays. That is what happened. The main engine program
has been beset with technical problems related mainly to the rotating
machinery. Although some of the problems were unresolved at the time
of the earlier study, when the committee conducted its follow-up
review in October 1978 both NASA and Rocketdyne reported that (in
their opinion) solutions to the problems, adequate for the first manned
orbital flight, had been ideiztified and in most cases tested. In fact,
significant progress had been made and the rate of testing had pro-
ceeded toward NASA's goal of 80,000 seconds of test time before the
first manned flight (rescheduled from March 1979 to September 1979).
Since the committee's first report, the accumulated test time as
of December 27 1978, has more than doubled to 34,810 seconds in
394 firings (s.. FiL-re 2). Of this total, a little more than
10,000 seconds has been at 100 percent rated power level, with seven
tests run at 100 percent rated power for the full 520 seconds that
the main engine operates during the launch. Furthermore, a test run
at 102 percent rated power has been completed and an "abort and
return-to-launch-site" test of 823 seconds has been made at
approximately 97 percent rated power.
Because most of the long test runs have been on one particular
engine (0005), it is not certain that all the problems have been
solved. Not unexpectedly, some nev , problems have been encountered.
These may constitute new obstacles to maintaining an orderly schedr..le
for the shuttle. The committee's specific concerns -re described and
evaluated in later sections of this report. Here, the committee
deals with previous concerns that have now been disposed of.
1National Research Council, Technical Status of the Space Shuttle
Main Engine. A report by the ad hoc Committee for Review of the
Space Shuttle Main Engine Development Program, Assembly of
Engineering. National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.
March 1978, pp. 1-2.
J
cl
z
0
sY
^W4
\	 o V PC!
n
IL
CO
QdLL O
N
Q
\
C
O
\
n 0
FO
m- ----------
--
LL
\ \ O
GO	 ^
^ CVIS
'^
IL 	 rn	 `
^c	 ^a
w
u
uG Q
\	 `
Q.\n
O)
' d
\
`
\
`	 1
0 
',
CL
WOQo
>
8 J
J
Q J
H H
U OQ f
W
07
z
O
to
Q
"'f
LL
\ z
\
\
0 ,,
n
N
Q
W
0
M
W
L
M
pCY
VC
i
8
8
m
0
mL
vc
L
F-
w
m
a
ID
W
N
O
W
m M
o a
z r
c^
r C7
mw
•• O
m C
0.-
v^
2E
w 7
c uu
4
z
O
FQ
nr
H
N
w
H
w
z
0
z
W
0
w
F-
QJ
UU
Q
W
` a
V LL
r -W
E^
»O
w ,o
a W
C G
r-
o e
8 LL
O w
8	 0	 8O
O
CO	 CO
N
W
LL
w
QN
Q
Z
cO
m
WU
DO
N
O	 O
O
O
N
SON003S
5In its first report, the committee had recommended the initiation
of an alternative design for the shaft and housing of the high-
pressure oxygen turbopump. NASA and Rocketdyne have responded fully
to this recommendation with a preliminary redesign involving bearing
relocation and housing redesign. In addition, they have made design
changes to the present high-pressure oxygen turbopump. Such changes
have the goal of achieving reliability for the early flight missions.
Some of the design changes have not only been completed but the
hardware is now being fabricated. The performance resulting from
such changes will be evaluated in the near future. During its review,
the committee has learned of a new design that has the potential for
marked improvements in the performance of seals and the reliability
of the high-pressure oxygen turbopump. If the space shuttle is to
become a successful space transportation system, such improvements
will be needed.
The first manned flight and the completion of the six orbital
flight tests are major milestones in the development of the operational
space transportation system for the 1980's. The later development of
the operational engine includes increasing its thrust rating to at
least 109 percent of rated power level, which is sometimes called full
power level, and developing the capability for safe and reliable
operation over a life of 55 missions, which means about 7-1/2 hours or
27,000 seconds of engine running time, with maintenance comparable to
that of commercial transport aircraft engines.
The development of such a life span is not necessary for the first
six orbital flights. In fact, to require such a lifetime capability
by 1979 or 1980 would be unrealistic and would result in inordinate
delays in the overall space shuttle program. Because high reliability,
long engine life, and performance (in terms of power level) cannot be
attained simultaneously within the schedule, the current approach is
to emphasize reliability at the rated power level (100 percent) at the
expense of engine life and full power level (109 percent rated rower).
The committee considers this order of priority appropriate. Thus, the
successful completion of the first six orbital flight tests does not
signify the end of the main engine development. Substantial further
development must proceed to elevate the thrust level to 109 percent of
rated power with high reliability and 72 hours life.
CONTINUING CONCERNS
Tear-down Inspection After First Flight
In its earlier report, the committee recommended a complete tear-down
inspection of the main engine after the first and sixth flights. In
the view of some rocket engine experts, however, a tear-down
inspection should be avoided unless visual inspection, including the
use of a borescope, l indicates otherwise. This is based on the
hypothesis that unless distress is visible or is indicated by a
deterioration of performance, it is best not to disassemble a working
engine. However valid this may be, some loading conditions are not
encountered until the system is flown -- for example, consider the
loads implied by the firing of solid rockets, maneuver loads, and
acoustical vibrations. The committee considered three approaches:
(i) a complete tear-down inspection of the three main engines after
the first flight; (ii) a complete tear-down inspection after the
third flight unless the visual inspection, borescoping, and data
indicate that an engine is distressed after an earlier flight; and,
(iii) a thorough inspection of one of the main engines after the
first flight, with the tear down of only the two high-pressure
turbopumps (and replacement of this engine with a spare).
On balance, the argument reduces to a simple point. In a
closely coupled engine, with high thrust-to-weight ratio, where the
performance could seriously deteriorate if some component fails to
work to the required level, the difference in g-round loads and flight
loads could cause significant changes in the lo yal deflection of
walls, shafts, seals, or bearing retaining housings. Such deflections
could cause wear and stress in locations that would not be detected by
visual inspection and borescoping. Furthermore, if the Preliminary
Flight Certification (firing tests of a single engine) and the
results of the Main Propulsion Test Article (firing three engines
simulating space flight operation) are accepted as valid, then there
lA boroscope is an instrument, now utilizing fiber optics technology,
used for illuminating and visually inspecting otherwise inacessible
places.
6
7should be no qualms about removing one engine for inspection and
replacing it with a spare. After considering the three approaches, the
committee still concludes that a tear-down inspection is essential and
now recommends a complete tear-down inspection of one engine after the
first flight and its replacement in the orbiter by a spare engine.
Depending on the outcome of the tear-down inspectionl and the results of
borescoping and visual inspection after subsequent flights, the inspec-
tion procedure for the first six flights could be established.
Moreover, the committee also considers a complete disassembly and
inspection of the engines to be essential after the sixth flight and
supports the NASA proposal of a visual inspection, including borescoping
the high-pressure turbopumps, after each of the orbital test flights.
Much can be learned during the flight tests that will bear on the
future development of the engine. NASA and Rocketdyne should allow for
this in their planning, if they are not already doing so.
Component Test Stand
The committee, in its first report, had recommended that NASA and
Rocketdyne explore means to acquire and operate a component-development
test rig for the rotating machinery of the main engines. Instead,
NASA and Rocketdyne have chosen to use a rocket engine itself for this
purpose. To this end, test stand A-3 ,at Santa Suzanna, California, has
been reactivated. The committee considers that this approach is far
from ideal and could lead to long delays in the event of major mishap
such as a failure in a high-pressure turbopump. Such a failure could
result during tests to explore the functional limits of components,
including the "red-line" limits for operational safety, because the
engine is used as a test stand. Thus, if further failures occur,
long delays will result unnecessarily.
An additional consideration is the possibility of an unexpected
failure of a con,,onent during the operational life of the shuttle. The
sustaining engineering program needed to support the shuttle may be
more economically and more effectively carried out through the use of
a component test stand. The committee is concerned that replacement
hardware will not be available when components fail and, worse yet, spare
engines will not be available for use as new test stands to replace those
lost as a result of component failures.
The committee considers that it is nc:t too late to develop a
component test rig. A component test rig would be valuable not only
in the testing process to extend the life of the engine to 72 hours,
but also for the sustaining engineering that is likely to prove
necessary over the useful life of the shuttle. While recognizing
that engines will have to be used for some time to test components,
the committee urges NASA and Rocketdyne to take appropriate actions
1The committee understands that no contingency plan exists to
cope with problem: uncovered by this inspection. This is a
consequence of a success-dependent program strategy.
8to acquire a component-development test rig.
Oxygen Heat Exchange
NAS," and Rocketdyne have complied with the committee's
recommendation to explore alternative designs to relocate or reconfig-
ure the oxidizer heat exchanger. The heat exchanger is now in a hot,
hydrogen-rich location (see Figure 1). Short of placing it in
a less perilous location, there is no practical way to eliminate the
threat to the total system in the event of a failure in the heat
exchanger. SiAce March 1978, NASA and Rocketdyne have made: a design
study of a "line-replaceable" heat exchanger that can be more
readily and thoroughly inspected in the field -- one that could be
replaced and would be less subject to damage during fabrication. As
designed, the new heat exchanger would be about 170 pounds heavier
than the present 20-pound heat exchanger. The present program plan
calls for completing the detailed design of the line-replaceable
heat exchanger and holding it as a back-up until it may be needed.
While the committee concurs with the actions taken to date, it
is still concerned with the present heat exchanger and reemphasizes
the statement in its previous report that urges continued attention
to the oxidizer heat exchanger by both NASA and Rocketdyne.
Evidence has been found that heat exchanger tubes have been
rubbing against their supports during some of the engine tests. Such
rubbing could lead to small holes in these tubes. With the oxygen
pressure in the tubes relatively high, even a small hole will emit a
jet of pure oxygen into the hydrogen-rich gas, which will result in
combustion within the heat exchanger. In this event, potential is
great for a disastrous explosion. It is of the utmost importance
that the heat exchanger be readily accessible for routine inspections
in the field. The committee recommends, therefore, that NASA and
Rocketdyne move ahead with the construction and testing of the
line-replaceable heat exchanger for installation in the shuttle main
engine as early as practicable.
Integrity of High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump Turbine Blades
In its earlier report, the committee noted the three failures
that had occurred in the high-pressure fuel turbopump turbine blades
up to that time. Because such problems are common in turbine
development, the committee assumes that the problems can be resolved
before the Preliminary Flight Certification tests are completed. To
that end, NASA and Rocketdyne have initiated an inspection program
to detect and remove blades that contain cracks they consider harmful.
For the longer term, however, the committee recommends that a more
aggressive program be established to understand the cause of the
turbine blade cracking in order to prevent it. The need exists for
improved blades. This can be achieved by (i) an improved blade
design, (ii) an improved alloy, (iii) a modified cast structure,
9(iv) a more flaw-free material, (v) a more searching and
inspection system -- or some combination of these. The
objective of improved turbine blades does not seem to ha:
in the main engine development prc:gram beyond today's st.
NEW CONCERNS
High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump Turbine Blades Platform Cracks
Since March 1978, no complete blade failures have occurred in the
high-pressure fuel turbopump turbine. The committee is concerned,
however, about the appearance of cracks in the blade platforms after
very few operating cycles. The cracks may be caused by low-cycle
thermal shock from the start-up and shut-down cycle. In addition, a
few cracks have developed in the leading edge of some blades. When a
crack is found in the leading edge of the blade, the blade is now
replaced. By contrast, NASA and Rocketdyne regard platform cracks as
tolerable unless these propagate into the blade. The difficulties
involved in perceiving clearly how far a crack has progressed is a
point of contention between the committee and NASA.
If blades with platform cracks are to be used at all, a decision
to regard a crack as having grown to a dangerous size must be based
on prior experience. Although such experience is not very extensive
at this time, it is being accumulated. Experience in the test
program to date has shown that the high-pressure fuel turbopump can
be operated for at least 15 start-stop cycles of the engine without
any failures in the turbine blades. After 15 start-stop cycles, the
high-pressure fuel turbopump is disassembled, the turbine blades
removed, the blade coatings stripped off, and any cracks carefully
examined. Then a metallurgical exaiqination is made, which includes
cutting, etching, and microscopically inspecting the blades. The
resulting data are being collected by Rocketdyne for a data base on
all the high-pressure fuel turbopump turbines in the program. By the
time of the first manned flight, it is expected that a substantial
amount of data will have been acquired. The data are intended to
provide confidence in the operational procedures yet to be established.
The committee suggests that the data be displayed in an appropriate
statistical distribution to justify with confidence the selected
interval between inspections.
Still, no program now exists for the prevention of cracks in the
turbine blade platforms of the high-pressure fuel turbopump. The
present planning allows the use of blades with small cracks in their
platforms for engines in the first manned orbital flight. Such a
10
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procedure is contrary to current, conventional practice. Thus, the
resu1
_.
^ of future tests must prove that: such platform cracks will
not result in actual or incipient failures of the blades. Therefore,
effective inspection measures must be used after each cycle of
operation, definite limits to crack size must be defined, and limits
on rate of growth must be established. Every effort must be made to
establish a technical and statistical basis justifying the use of
blades with platform cracks in early flights.
The committee understands that NASA ' s Marshall Space Flight
Center has initiated a full - scale fracture mechanics program to
determine the rate these cracks grow and the inspection interval
needed to ensure that no crack-induced failure occurs between
inspections. The Marshall program is intended to complement the
Rocketdyne program. If this fracture mechanics program is fully
successful, the committee deems the inspection intervals will be
well defined prior to the first flight. In any event, the committee
recommends that NASA prepare and document detailed procedures for
determining crack growth rates and develop statistical data to justify
its confidence in this matter.
High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump Turbine Blades Coatin
Rocketdyne is conducting a relatively extensive program to find
a satisfactory coating for the high-pressure fuel turbopump turbine
blades. The program was undertaken initially to develop a reliable
coating to enable the blades to tolerate thermal spikes, which are
high gas temperatures for very short pe--iods, that occurred during
the early engine tests. Since then, thermal spikes have been
greatly reduced. The stated justification for coating the blades
was to suppress thermal shock stresses generated in start-stop
operation. The committee considers that the need for coatings is
questionable and that sometimes they are the cause of problems.
For example, if the coating is not well bonded to the blade material,
it will spall or peel, causing turbine wheel unbalance and vibration.
If the coating is well bonded, cracks in the coating can propagate
into the blade material.
Since the original need for coating the high-pressure fuel
turbopump turbine blades seems to have been eliminated, any expected
benefit from coating seems to be questionable. Therefore, the com-
mittee recommends that test runs with uncoated blades be included in
the test program. If the results support the hypothesis that coating
is not warranted, the use of a coating should be discontinued.
Low-Pressure Fuel Turbonumn Turbine Bearinz Fretting
During the course of tests, fretting of the turbine end-bearing
has been observed in the low-pressure fuel turbopump. Fretting is
usually indicative of inadequate bearing retention, which permits
relative movement between the bearing and its journal or housing.
Under such circumstances, fretting cannot be alleviated by dry
12
lubrication. The relative motion needs to be reduced by proper
bearing retention. This will involve a redesign of this part of
the low-pressure fuel turbopump. The committee, therefore, recommends
Oat the turbine bearing retention system on the low-pressure fuel
turbopump be redesigned to reduce the relative motion between the
bearing and its journal or housing.
Main Injector Oxidizer Post Shields
In early summer of 1978, a aumber of failures occurred in the
oxidizer posts in the main injector of engines 0002 and 0005. Design
modifications have been made to prevent such failures from recurring.
The oxidizer posts (see Figure 1) carry oxygen internally through the
main injector to the combustion chamber. An array of these posts
separates the oxygen from the hot, hydrogen-rich gas, which flows
around, and impinges on, the posts at high pressure and relatively
high velocity. Thread-cracking in the posts has been attributed to
vibration in bending. The cause of the failures is postulated to
be fluid mechanical forces. These failures allow oxygen to leak and
mix with the fuel, leading to premature burning. Once this happens,
failures occur in adjacent posts.
To remedy this problem, steel shields have been installed on
adjacent pairs of the oxidizer posts in the outer ring of posts --
i.e., those first encountered by the incoming hot gas. The function
of the shields, according to NASA, is to protect the first row of
posts from the incoming flow and to break up high-frequency oscil-
lations in the wake of the posts -- thus reducing the vibratory loads
and stresses in the threads. Subsequent tests have shown the shields
to be effective in eliminating the pressure oscillations and reducing
the loads in the posts. To date, tests have demonstrated a lifetime
for the shields and posts in excess of 5,000 seconds. Calculations
indicate that the shields will outlast the projected 7z-hour lifetime
of the engine. The modification to the main injector has increased
the weight of the engine about 13 pounds. A major part of the
increase is due to the addition of 42 oxidizer post shields.
Of concern to the committee is the measured increase in the
turbine inlet temperature of the high-pressure fuel turbopump at
rated power level after the post shields were installed. The higher
temperature is caused by the increased power required to overcome
the pressure loss when the flow is restricted by the shields.
Consequently, the committee recommends for the intermediate term that
a study be undertaken to identify and eliminate the source of the
unsteady flow at the first row of posts. Rocketdyne has proposed a
new post design and material (Haynes-188) intended to resolve the
problem of the injector post failures without the use of the shields,
thereby eliminating the resulting temperature increase in the high-
pressure fuel turbopump turbine inlet. This has not yet been tested.
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Flight Certification
The engine development program includes a Preliminary Flight
Certification that consists of a set of ground tests on a single engine.
The purpose of these tests is to certify the engine configuration for
use in the first six orbital flights.
In its initial report, the committee made certain recommendations
with respect to the minimum test requirements for Preliminary Flight
Certification that should be fulfilled in tests on a single
"flight-configured engine" before the first manr_ed orbital flight.
NASA and Rocketdyne now propose PreVLminary Flight Certification test
requirements that are essentially in agreement with and, in some
aspects, more stringent than the committee's recommendation. The
proposed requirements call for an accumulation of 5,000 seconds of
engine test time, including at least 3,000 seconds at rated power
level and 425 seconds at 102 percent rated power level, as well as
one aborted-flight simulation involving either abort-to-orbit
(665 seconds at rated power level) or abort with return-to-launch-site
(823 seconds at rated power level). The committee endorses this set
of Preliminary Flight Certification requirements as an adequate
demonstration of the engine's performance and reliability for the
first manned orbital flight.
However, the committee is concerned that because of design changes,
the engines to be used in the orbital flight tests are not exactly
the same configuration as the engine to be tested in the Preliminary
Flight Certification. The differences are significant. While the
committee continues to recommend the use of a "flight-configured
engine" for the Preliminary Flight Certification tests, it concludes
that the Certification, as presently scheduled, is premature. The
committee recommends that curren ly planned testing continue but that
the formal Preliminary Flight Certification be delayed until the
configuration of the engine to be certified is the same as the actual
flight engines in all respects affecting safety.
The Preliminary Flight Certification should be viewed as a formal
event. If there are any configuration differences, NASA, Rocketdy, ►e,
and in particular the Material Review Board and the NASA Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel should agree in advance on the acceptability of
the configuration to be certified. Similarly, if any changes are made
during Preliminary Flight Certification testing, the acceptability
should be redetermined by the same groups.
Component Test Requirements for Orbital Flight Tests
It has been standard nractice for manned space flights using
expendable launch vehicles that the engines be subjected to ground
tests for at least ten times the duration of the actual flight.
This testing protocol has provided an adequate margin to account for
variations from engine to engine and for unforeseen events that might
occur in flight. By contrast, the shuttle engine, unlike previous
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manned space propulsion systems,is designed to be reused in subsequent
launches after inspection and, if necessary, repair and refurbishment.
Therefore, the committee considers it unnecessarily stringent to
require engine ground testing amounting to ten times the flight
duration for the space shuttle main engine for flights after the
first. In the committee's judgment, the performance and reliability
of all components in the flight engine should be demonstrated by
ground tests for a life of at least three times the use such a
component will encounter in the six orbital flight tests.
Because the total engine-on flight time for the orbital flight
test program is about 3,000 seconds (520 seconds per flight), the
committee recommends that, insofar as practicable, all c:o.nponents of
the engine be tested to the point where single components have each
accumulated at least 10,000 seconds (see Figure 3). (me way to
rccomplish this objective is to continue testing the engine used in
the Preliminary Flight Certification tests toward the goal of
10,000 seconds. Alternatively, designated components could be run
on research and development engines until the 10,000-second goal is
attained for each component. Because it seems likely that some minor
components, whose replacement is not a matter of concern, will not
survive! these tests, a list of components that could be replaced
without risk to the program needs to be agreed upon in advance by
appropriate NASA review groups and by Rocketdyne.
Should any engine component fail to attain the objective of
10,000 seconds, the committee recommends that it be replaced in the
engine during the orbital flight test program but not to be flown
for more than 30 percent of the successfully accomplished test time
for the component. It is recommended that any exception to this
procedure be approved at the highest level of NASA.
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RECENT ACCIDENTS
In December 1978, two main engines experienced damaging malfunctions
while being tested at the National Space Technology Laboratories at
Bay St. Louis, Mississippi. After NASA and Rocketdyne had examined
the engines and evaluated the failures, they reported their findings
to the committee.
Engine 0007
During the first checkout test for the preflight certification
of engine 0007 on Decembe7 S, 1978, a,i explosion occurred in the heat
exchanger at 3.5 seconds aE the planned run of 50 seconds. The
source of the failure was attributed to a leak in the coil tubing of
the neai exchanger, which was caused, according to the explanation,
by a weakness in the tubing that occurred during arc welding while
an adjacent bracket was reworked with the heat exchanger still in
the engine. The weakness went undetected because existing procedures
did not call for a detailed inspection or proof-test of the reworked
part. As a result, the heat exchanger and high-pressure oxygen
turbopump, both integral to the engine, were damaged -- though these
and other major components of the engine are considered reusable.
Inspection procedur-s and pressure testing have now been established
for similar repairs.
The committee recognizes the description of the cause of the
explosion as a possible order of events but points out that there are
two other ways the failure in the tubing could have occurred --- i.e.,
very high internal pressure caused by a restriction, such as debris,
in the tubing or slow growth of a flaw in the tubing. In any
event, the committee recommends that NASA and Rocketdyne establish
inspections and proof testing or rebalance procedures as appropriate
for all reworked parts. The paucity of development hardware in the
program, coupled with the ambitious test schedule, makes the use of
refurbished parts a certainty. While the practice of using reworked
parts and subcomponents provides valuable experience in the
development of an eiLgine for a 7z-hour life cycle, it increases the
chance for flaws or malfunctions, with the consequent risk of
failures. Therefore, the committee considers it necessary for NASA
and Rocketdyne to develop ap propriate inspection procedures with a
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sense of urgency. Because the committee considers a failure in any
part of the oxygen system to be potentially catastrophic, the accident
in Engine 0007 reinforces the committee's concern, expressed in its
first report, about a single-point failure in the heat exchanger.
Engine 2001
Engine 2001 had passed the acceptance test in January 1978 and
completed four Main Propulsion Test Article runs between April and
July 1978 -- accumulating a total of 287 seconds of test time. After
this series of tests, the engine was returned to Rocketdyne for a
turbopump retrofit. Then, during the third of a new series of
acceptance tests, at 255.6 seconds of its test run, fire broke out in
the main oxidizer valve, leading to extensive damage to the engine
and the A-1 test stand. The failure was caused by a sequence of
events: pressure oscillation in the oxygen flow led to vibrations in
the main oxidizer valve inlet sleeve, which were sufficient to loosen
one of eight retainer screws and allow fretting between metal parts;
this resulted in enough friction to heat the metal to its ignition
point in pure oxygen.
Actions to avoid fretting in the future include replacing the
thin metal shims with ground shims, coating the surfaces with an
oxygen-compatible dry lubrizant, l and replacing the cap screws with
screws with a conical shoulder, and providing conical seats incorpor-
ating a locking device. The committee supports the need for remedial
changes.
In the design goals of compactness and lightness in the closely
coupled main shuttle engine, vibrations of fluid-mechanical origin
may occur. This provides considerable potential for rubbing or
fretting. The committee recommends, therefore, that all fasteners
should be examined for loose,ii^g and wherever feasible all means of
eliminating such loosening should be incorporated.
Rocketdyne has initiated an investigation into the source of
the vibrations in the main oxidizer valve and potential remedies.
The committee considers further investigation into this problem to
be important to pursue.
This episode underscores the earlier finding by the committee
that parts and components need to be tested individually before they
are assembled and tested as an engine system. If the main oxidizer
valve had been mounted in a test stand so that its compliance could
have been the same as in the engine assembly and tested, the vibration
and fretting might have been identified early in the test program.
One of the effects of both incidents is to highlight the shortage
of spare parts and components -- not only to ensure that the test and
development program can be completed on a reasonably early schedule
1 During a discussion of dry lubricants, the committee concluded that
more study is needed to make a convincing case that dry lubricants
can be used safely.
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but to provide enough hardware for the manned flight tests and later
operational missions. The situation appears more critical now than
at the time of the committee's last review.
In a previous section of this report, the committee has noted
that replacement parts and additional engines to be used as test
stands will be needed to advance the progress of the program in the
event of malfunctions and accidents. To ignore this in a develop-
ment program as highly complex as this one is to take inescapable
risks. Therefore, the committee urges that a plan be drawn up and
carried out as quickly as possible to provide additional replace-
ment parts and engines for the space shuttle main engine program.
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SCHEDULE CONCERNS
Some components or parts of the engine to be tested for Preliminary
Flight Certification are new relative to the configurations used in
the research and development engines previously tested. Incorporating
previously untested components in an engine designated for certifica-
tion is considered unusual and is disturbing to the committee. This
procedure would reduce the probability of success of the Preliminary
Flight Certification. The existence of any components with very
little test time, such as the P-6 engine controller and the new im-
pellor for the high-pressure fuel turbopump, leads the committee
inexorably to the conclusion that an early Preliminary Flight
Certification is unlikely. Any failure (not necessarily catastrophic)
will lead to program delays. This is particularly true because of
the existing shortage of development engines, spare parts, and test
stands. These shortages undermine the expectation for an early
manned orbital flight. In view of this, it appears unlikely that
the first manned orbital flight will occur before April or May 1980.
The first manned flight could be somewhat earlier only if the engine
testing program encounters minimal or no difficulties--an improbability,
considering the previous test history of the shuttle main engine.
Once the recommended tests are completed in a satisfactory way,
the committee is confident the main engines will verform safely for
the first manned orbital flight.
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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
A. With respect to the first manned orbital flight, the committee
recommends that:
o No significant differences should exist in the shuttle
main engine that NASA intends to certify and the one it
intends to fly. The formal Preliminary Flight Certifi-
cation should be delayed until an engine of flight
configuration is available for testing.
o NASA and Rocketdyne should prepare a detailed technical
case for the method for determining platform crack
growth rates, the intervals and procedures of
inspection, and the criteria for the replacement of
turbine blades in the high-pressure fuel turbopump.
The case should explain the rationale and demonstrate
that engine operation with some platform cracks is not
harmful.
o One engine should be removed from the shuttle orbiter
following the first flight and a complete tear down
and inspection performed for signs of wear or stress.
B. For later in the manned orbital flight program, the committee
recommends that:
o An agreed upon list of engine components should be
tested to the point where individual components have
each accumulated 10,000 seconds of test time before
the sixth orbital flight. The test time is to be
accumulated on a schedule t. ►at maintains about 3:1
ratio between total time in ground tests and total
time in flight on any single component or assembly.
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C. For the longer term in the shuttle flight program, the committee
recommends that:
o A plan to acquire additional engine test and development
hardware should be prepared and implemented in the
program as soon as possible.
o Appropriate actions should be taken to acquire a
component-development test rig as early as possible, not
only for use in the engine development but for use in
the sustaining engineering program when the shuttle
becomes operational.
o The turbine bearing retention system on the low-pressure
fuel turbopump should be redesigned to reduce any
relative motion or fretting between the bearing and its
journal or housing, eliminating the need for dry film
lubrication.
o Tests of the high-pressure fuel turbopump should take
place with uncoated turbine blades, and if test results
indicate that a coating is not warranted, its use
should be discontinued.
o A program should be established to gain an understanding
of the source of platform crackrz in the high-pressure
fuel turbopump turbine blades -- a program designed to
lead to crack prevention.
o An aggressive program should be undertaken to gain an
understanding of the cracking of the high-pressure fuel
turbopump turbine blades in order to prevent its
occurrence.
o A study should be undertaken to define the primary cause
of the oxidizer injector post failure to provide a "fix"
without the need for shields, thus eliminating the
source of increased turbine inlet temperature in the
high-pressure fuel turbopump.
o The design, development, construction, and testing of an
alternative high-pressure oxygen turbopump should
continue in order to be ready to be installed in the
engines by 1983 or 1984.
o A line-replaceable heat exchanger should be constructed
and tested for installation in the shuttle main engines
as early as practicable.
